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HOW GREEN WAS THEIR VOLLEY?
The cost of the high tariffs and protectionism was war
Riddle, Wesley Allen
Spring 2000

Adams, Charles When in the Course of Human Events: Arguing the Case for
Southern Secession. Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN 847697223
Was the devastation of the War Between the States and the enduring
sectional antipathies necessary? Were northern motives as lofty as historians
have maintained?
Charles Adams is perhaps the world's leading scholar on the history of
taxation, as well as author of the bestseller For Good and Evil: The Impact of
Taxes on the Course of Civilization (second edition, 1999). Indeed, a short
chapter in that book positing strong connection between taxes and the Civil War
was a genesis for Adams's extended treatment of the subject in When in the
Course of Human Events. Certainly the more- than-30-year wrangle over
tariffs prior to the Civil War is well-known. John C. Calhoun believed that
federal import tax laws were injurious to the South, a form of tribute exacted
from her by the North. Since the South was the great exporting portion of the
Union, it paid more than a proportionate share of revenue to the federal
government. Moreover, disbursements for "national" improvements were
decidedly lopsided in favor of the North.
By the time Abraham Lincoln was elected, with little southern support, to
the presidency, demographic trends were consigning the South to permanent
minority status within the Union. The Republican Party was a northern sectional
party, and its platform called for high tariffs. To Adams, high tariff obligations to
northern industrialists and manufacturers were explicit, and this was more
important to Southerners than vague and conflicting northern opposition to
slavery. With the Morrill Tariff, the Republican Congress inaugurated a policy
of high protectionism in March 1861 that would last for decades. It was the
highest tariff yet in American history, with average rates of 47 percent. A de
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facto "war of the tariffs" began when the Confederate Constitution banned high
import taxation and essentially created a free trade zone to the south. Monied
interests in the North eschewed peaceful secession, since trade would shift from
Boston, New York, and Philadelphia to Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans.
Adams roundly impugns the motives of the North. Lincoln's concern for
enslaved blacks was more a facade than substance. Northern apologists just
needed something more glamorous to fight for than taxes, and emancipation fit
the bill. Southern slavery was tolerable -- southern free ports were not. Slavery
was an issue that could be negotiated -- tax policy, however, was nonnegotiable.
Granted, Lincoln said as much in his First Inaugural: he would not use federal
power to prevent states from doing what they wished politically, only "to collect
the duties and impost." Ft. Sumter was the tax collection base for Charleston
Harbor. Other federal properties had been peacefully abandoned and some taken
by force, but Lincoln resolved to keep the money maker. Lincoln notified the
governor of South Carolina that he would bring in provisions, by force if
necessary. Confederate Secretary of State Robert Toombs warned that
Southerners were being baited, but they seized the fort before provisions could
get there.
Despite commotion and fireworks, no one was actually hurt in the takeover
of Fort Sumter. After running out of ammunition, Major Anderson surrendered
the fort. The men were sent home, but Lincoln wasted no time in requesting
75,000 volunteers to put down "rebellion." The first casualties actually occurred
a week later, when volunteers from Massachusetts killed 12 civilians in
Baltimore. The Upper South seceded, and war was on for all practical purposes.
Besides precipitating the attack on Ft. Sumter and rejecting a negotiated
settlement, Lincoln seized dictatorial powers and suspended the Constitution.
Unlike Franklin Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor, Lincoln circumvented a
constitutional duty to call Congress in the event of an emergency, delaying the
meeting for three months. In the meantime, he made decisions that arrogated to
himself the power of Congress, courts, and the states. The effect was to commit
the nation irrevocably to war for so-called preservation of the Union -- that is to
say, preservation of the Union's revenue.
International opinion, especially in Britain, was thrown aback with
amazement. The American nation had stood squarely for self-determination.
Millions of people separating en masse as political states, through elective,
representative, and constitutional government, did not resemble rebellion.
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Rather, it was more like one nation separating from another along contiguous
and discernible boundaries -- much like the American Revolution, a colonial
secession from the Mother Country. The Declaration of Independence had
indeed established secessionist doctrine in universalist terms of language. The
words began "When in the Course of Human Events," from which Adams draws
his title. John Stuart Mill was one of the few Britons to assign to slavery a
causative significance for the War. He also assigned moral imperative to the
victory of northern arms. Mill's views, published in Fraser's magazine, may have
led to the trans-Atlantic spread of those ideas.
Adams strongly criticizes Lincoln for unilaterally suspending the writ of
habeas corpus, probably the most important provision of the Bill of Rights.
Lincoln closed over 300 presses and imprisoned tens of thousands of his political
opponents. He imposed martial law in the North, enabling military tribunals to
convict civilians and to execute them without appeal. Lincoln even tried to arrest
the chief justice of the Supreme Court. Adams explains that Jefferson Davis
escaped state trial and execution because, notwithstanding Reconstruction,
constitutional processes reasserted themselves after the War. Attorneys general
and prosecutors concluded that the legal case against secession could not be won
in a bona fide court setting. War had settled the issue and trumped legal
consideration or antebellum constitutionality. Finally, Adams indicts Lincoln for
shifting responsibility for the War's terrible devastation and his government's
tyranny from himself to God, Lincoln's fatalistic Calvinism verging on the
"psychotic."
Adams's critique of Lincoln is not always objective. He can be as shrill as
Clement Vallandigham, or the other western Copperheads whom he calls
"peacemakers." Adams poses questions too often in a rhetorical style, then
answers himself with assertions and circumstantial evidence. His commentary on
the nature of warfare and the Civil War generation's love-obsession with war is
bizarre; his reference to the Minnesota Sioux uprising uninformed. Adams does,
however, contribute a much-needed alternative to uncritical Lincoln-adoration in
history. He also successfully debunks the simplistic and mythical understanding
of the War Between the States as an unqualified moral crusade to end slavery.
Wesley Allen Riddle is fellow at the National Humanities Institute.
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